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Articles
DUTIES TO ANIMALS: RAWLS'
01 LEMMA
I n his .6. I~_eory' of )J:!stice John
In
Rawls observes that his theory of
"justice as fa; rness" is not a complete
ethical theory because, among other
reasons, it "would seem to include
only our relations with other persons
and to leave out of account how we
are to conduct ourselves toward aniani
mals and the rest of nature. "1 In an
earlip.r essay Rawls is less qualified in
excluding animals from the protection
afforded by principles of justice.
In
"The Sense of Justice" he maintains
that it is a necessary and sufficient
condition of falling under principles of
justice that one be a person or that
one "be capable, to a certain minimum
degree, of a sense of justice. "2
If
having this capacity is a necessary
condition of being owed the duty of
justice, and given the plain fact that
animals fail to satisfy it, then animals
are not owed the duty of justice.
That is the teaching of the Rawls of
"The Sense of Justice." In A Theory
of Justice, however, Rawls states that
he has "not maintained that the capaccapac
ity for a sense of justice is necessary
to be owed duties of justice" (p.
512), which seems to soften his earlier
position. 3 But Rawls does not go on
to claim that animals are owed duties
of justice. Rather, heobserves that
"it does seem that we are not required
to give strict justice" to creatu res
who lack a capacity for a sense of
justice (I bid., emphasis added). Why
this only "seems" to be so is not fully
explained by Rawls, except for the
fact" that animals are creatures who
lack a "sense of justice" and/or are
not "persons," in his sense.
We have, then, what appear to be
two positions concerning the relationrelation
ship between animals and justice.
The strong position, set forth in "The
Sense of Justice," is that, since aniani
mals are not persons, they are not

owed justice. The weak position, set
forth in A TheorJ:!. of justice, is that,
because animals are not persons, it
seems that they are not owed justice.
Neither position, I believe, is defensidefensi
ble, not only because both are at
odds with what seems to me to be a
superior, non-Rawlsian account of jusjus
tice and our duties of justice to aniani
mals (a yery long story) but because
neither is consistent with Rawls' own
views about natu ral duties (a shorter
one: the topic of this essay). This
will become clearer once we have
explored his views about such duties.
After having noted, in A Theory' of
Justice, that "it does seem that we
are not required to give strict justice"
to creatures who are not persons,
Rawls goes on to state the following.
(I)t does not follow that there
are no requirements at all in
regard
to
them
(i. e.,
ani
animals) .... Certainly it is wrong to
be cruel to animals and the
destruction of whole species can
be a great evil. (p. 512)
Thus, though animals are not perper
sons, and so are not owed, or at least
it "seems" that they are not owed,
strict justice, we do have duties in
their case, in particular the duty not
to be cruel to them.
If we assume,
for the present, that this latter duty
is a duty we have directly to animals
rather than, as Kant for example
maintains, that this and other duties
regarding animals are "indirect duties
towards humanity, "4 then Rawls' posiposi
tion comes to this: We have some
direct duties to animals, despite the
fact that they are not persons, but
we do not have a duty of justice to
them, or at least it "seems" that we
do not.
This difference between those to
whom we owe the duty of justice, on
the one hand, and those to whom we
owe the duty not to be cruel, on the
other, is at odds with what Rawls
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says about these duties elsewhere in
T heo
h eo r:y' of ~J:I._sj:i ce . Ins ect ion
ion 19 of
that work (" Principles for Individuals:
The Natu ral Duties") Rawls offers two
characteristics of what he calls natural
duties.
Fi rst, "they apply to us
without regard to our voluntary acts"
(p. 114), and second "they hold
between persons irrespective of their
institutional
arrangements,"
"obtain(ing) between all
as equal
moral persons" (p. 115).
The first
characteristic
distinguishes
natural
duties from those duties, such as the
duty to keep a promise, which arise
as a result of the performance of a
voluntary act; the second distindistin
gu ishes natu ral duties from those
which we have as a result of our
occupying a given place in an instituinstitu
tional arrangement (e. g., the duty of
an employee to an employer).
~

Rawls lists examples of natu ral
duties.
Of particu lar importance for
present purposes is the fact that the
list includes both "the natural duty
not to be crueT'(p.114) and the duty
of justice" (p. 115).
The dilemma
Rawls must face should already be
apparent.
Natural duties, he says,
hold between persons -- "between all
as equal moral persons." But animals
are not persons, which is why we are
not required, or at least "it does seem
that we are not required,
"to give
strict justice" to them.
If, however,
both the duty not to be cruel and the
duty of justice are natural duties; if
natural duties hold equally between all
persons; and if the fact that animals
are not persons casts doubt upon or
undermines ou r having the natu ral
duty of justice to them; then the fact
that animals are not persons should
also cast doubt upon or undermine our
having the natural duty not to be
cruel to animals. On the other hand,
if the fact that animals are not perper
sons does not by itself show or raise
the suspicion that we do not have the
natural duty against being cruel to
II

animals, then this same fact cannot by
itself show or raise the suspicion that
we do not have the natural duty of
justice to them.
Yet Rawls denies
that we have the duty of justice to
them (the strong position) or (the
weak position) affirms that it at least
"seems" that we do not. The dilemma
that Rawls must face, then, is that he
simply cannot have it both ways.
Either being a person is a decisive
consideration for determining those to
whom we have or "seem" to have natnat
ural duties, in which case he cannot
believe that we have a natu ral duty
directly to animals not to be cruel to
them, or being a person is not a decideci
sive consideration, in which case he
cannot advocate either his strong or
his weak position regarding animals
and the duty of justice.
Whichever
alternative Rawls should choose, it
must be one or the other, not both.
Th ree replies which seek to defuse
this dilemma are worth considering.
I.
It might be objected that the
duty of justice can only obtain
between individuals who can have this
duty to each other and that this is a
relevant difference between this duty
and the duty not to be cruel. In
I n the
case of this latter duty, this objection
holds, we have it to animals despite
the fact that they do not have it (or
any other duty) to us.
In the case
of the duty of justice, however, we
do not have it to an imals because they
cannot have this duty to us.
This reply goes no way toward
defending a disanalogous understandunderstand
ing of the two natural duties in quesques
tion. What one wants is an explanaexplana
tion of why the fact that animals
cannot owe the duty of justice rules
out their being being owed this duty
(or at least "seems" to) if the fact
that they cannot owe the duty not to
be cruel does not rule out (or "seem"
to rule out) their being owed that
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contractors.

duty.
The objection just sketched
fails to provide such an explanation,
and it is difficult to imagine what
such an explanation might look like.
What might appear to be the two most
promising kinds of explanation are not
available to Rawls, given his analysis
of natu ral duties. We cannot say that
we have no duty of justice to an imals
because they stand outside certain
actual political or other types of
arrangements; natural duties do not
depend for their binding force on
such arrangements.
Nor can we say
that we have no duty of justice to
animals because we have not ourour
selves, as actual persons in in the
actual
world,
entered
into
any
"agreement" with them; natural duties
do not depend for thei r existence on
the performance or non -performance of
any voluntary act on the part of anyany
one in the actual world. This much
granted, it should be clear that no
appeal to our acts or our institutions
can provide g rounds for disenfranchisdisenfranchis
ing animals, when it comes to the natnat
ural duty of justice or to any other
natural duty.

This objection merits two replies
((A) and (8) below), the first of
which engenders two critical replies of
its own ((1) and (2) below). (A) To
allow that the original contractors
know that they will become human
beings, when they are "incarnated,"
is to prejudice the question of who is
owed the duty of justice in favor of
human beings and against animals from
the outset. This prejudicial backdrop
of the original position not on Iy
offends against the requirement that
we be impartial in our assessment of
relevant interests; what is more, to
allow the original contractors to know
that they will be human beings but
not animals runs counter to what the
"veil of ignorance" is supposed to
accomplish. That veil cannot be thick
enough if, while denying those in the
original position knowledge about, for
example, what race or sex they will
be, when they come to be in the
actual world, it nevertheless allows
them to know the species to which
they wi II belong. 5

II.
The second reply ignores the
contingencies of the actual world and
refers instead to the hypothetical sitsit
uation of the "original
position. "
Animals are owed the duty against
being cruel, but not the duty of jusjus
tice, according to this second reply,
because this is the judgment that
would be reached by those in the
original position. After all, since the
origi nal contractors are self-i nterested
persons who know they will be human
beings, when they are "incarnated" in
the actual world, if we might put matmat
ters in these terms, they will view the
duty of justice in a way that is calcucalcu
lated to forward their self interest as
the human beings they know they will
become. Thus, to exclude animals for
those to whom the duty of justice is
owed can ha rdly be contra ry to the
self
interest
of
the
original

(1)
Perhaps it will be objected
that the supposition that any person
in the original position could become a
non-human animal would render the
very point of the original position
incoherent.
Since persons in that
position are being asked to choose
basic principles of justice, principles
which, among other things, are to lay
the foundation of social and political
institutions which will govern the disdis
tribution of ha rms and benefits to
those who can meaningfully be said to
be beneficiaries in their own right,
animals can be excluded from considconsid
eration. Whatever else we might want
to say about animals, it might be
claimed, they cannot have "a good
life" and thus cannot be beneficiaries
in the relevant sense.
To deny that
they are owed duties of justice thus is
not arbitrary.
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Now, this response has a point, up
to a point. It is doubtful at best that
we can reasonably view , say, grassgrass
hoppers or fleas as themselves either
having or not having a life which
fares well or ill ·for them considered
as individuals.
However, the situasitua
tion with respect to other animals --
let us call them "higher animals"-- is
importantly different.
The case can
be made, I believe, for regarding
mammalian animals in particular as
being conscious and sentient; as havhav
ing desires or preferences which they
may either satisfy or have frustrated;
as having various higher order cognicogni
tive capacities, including memory and
the ability to form beliefs, including
beliefs which
relate to their own
future; as agents in the world, in the
sense that they can act intentionally
or pu rposively, on the basis of thei r
beliefs, to bring about the satisfaction
of their desires or preferences; and
as individuals who have a psychopsycho
physical identity over time. 6
In the
case of these animals, therefore, it
makes perfectly good sense to view
them as having an individual welfare
-- as faring well or ill during the
course of their experiential life, logiclogic
ally independently of whether anyone
else happens to value what happens to
them.
Mammalian animals (and possipossi
bly others, including birds, though
where one draws the line in this
regard is admittedly difficult and concon
troversial) th us can have a good life,
relative to their nature, and thus can
be beneficiaries in the relevant sense,
even if it is true that because of thei r
limited
intellectual
capacities
they
themselves are unable to form a concon
ception of thei r welfa re, have a sense
of justice, or adopt a rational life
plan . Accordingly, assuming that the
principles of justice to be selected by
those in the original position concern,
among other things, the distribution
of those harms and benefits which are
essential to an individual's having a
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good life, the selection would exclude
only some animals from being owed
duties of justice. Higher animals (and
these are the animals I have in mind
henceforth) would, or at least should,
be covered by the principles which
are chosen. The charge of arbitrariarbitrari
ness has not been met.
(2) It might be objected that it is
not justice
but metaphysics
that
excludes even higher animals from
being owed duties of justice.
To
suppose that a person in the originai
position could be "incarnated" as a
higher animal, it might be claimed, is
to violate standard metaphysical views
about identity. Metaphysically, a dog
or a ch impanzee just can't be the same
individual who once occupied a place
in the original position.
It is not
arbitrary to exclude animals from
being owed duties of justice, therethere
fore, since even the original contraccontrac
tors may be permitted to know metameta
physical truths, including the truth
that, whatever else might transpi re in
the actual world
when they are
"incarnated." they simply can't trlrn
out to be a (non-human) animal.
Problems of identity are admittedly
serious problems, but their seriousserious
ness cuts both ways in the present
case. If it is true, as Rawls allows,
that any given person in the original
position might turn out to be a human
idiot or worse when he comes to be in
the actual world, and still be the same
individual he was in the original posiposi
tion, then the possession of the cencen
tral characteristic definitive of moral
personality (a sense of justice) cannot
be a criterion of personal identity.
That being so, what ! .eriori reason
can there be against a person in the
original position being "incarnated" as
a dog or chimpanzee? It would be a
palpable double standard to affirm
that a human idiot can be the same
individual as one of the persons in
the original position despite the fact
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that, as an idiot, he lacks a sense of
justice, but to deny that a dog or
chimpanzee can be the same individual
as one of the persons in the original
position because, given their cognitive
and mor'al poverty, these animals lack
a sense of justice.
Moreover, to
attempt to avoid this dislay of arbiarbi
trariness by supposing that persons
in the original position "just know"
that they will be human beings, howhow
ever handicapped, begs the question
rather than answering it.
For the
question at issue is how animals can
be non-arbitrarily excluded from those
who are owed duties of justice.
To
attempt to avoid the point of this
question by assuming that the original
contractors "just know" what species
they will belong to, when they are
"incarnated," is to repeat the problem
rather than to resolve it. Thus, neinei
ther of the anticipated objections ((1)
and (2) above) to the charge that the
"veil of ignorance" arbitrarily allows
those in the original position to know
what species they wi II belong to sucsuc
ceeds in nullifying this charge.
(B) A further difficulty inherent
in appeals to the original position in
the present case also merits mentionmention
ing . If, following Rawls, we assume
that those in the original position
know that they will be human beings,
when they are "incarnated" in the
actual world, we need to ask what
possible basis the original contractors
can have for agreeing that there is a
natural duty not to be cruel which is
owed directly to animals. The duties
these contractors will recognize must
be contingent upon what duties are in
thei r self interest to recognize.
But
if, ex hypothesi, those in the original
position will never become animals,
and know this, then they cannot pospos
sibly have any self-interested reason
to recognize a direct duty not to be
cruel to animals -- a duty, that is,
owed directly to animals independently
of human interests.
Thus, if the
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duty not to be cruel IS a natu ral
duty, which is what Rawls says it is,
and if we have this duty directly to
animals, which is what he evidently
believes, then the grounds for our
having this duty directly to animals
are not to be found by asking about
the supposed "outcome of a hypothetihypotheti
cal
agreement"
(p.
115)
struck
between the self-interested persons in
the original position, as Rawls underunder
stands
this.
A
contract
wh ich
includes direct duties to animals,
.ncluding the direct duty not to be
cruel to them, cannot be forthcoming
if the only basis for selecting duties
is the yardstick of human interest.
I n view of the two objections ((A)
In
and (B) above) raised against the
second reply, therefore, Rawls cannot
be spared the pain of the dilemma
urged against him by having recourse
to what does or does not transpire in
the origi nal position.
III. A third attempt to defuse this
dilemma is to credit Rawls with the
view that we have no di rect duties to
animals, something we have been
assuming he would accept from the
outset. But the view that we have no
direct duties to animals is not only
implausible in its own right, for rearea
sons I have adduced on other occaocca
sions and shall not repeat here; 7 more
importantly for present purposes, it is
also at odds with the general tenor of
what Rawls himself says about ou r
duties regarding animals.
For Rawls
explicitly states that "(t) he capacity
for feelings of pleasure and pain and
for the forms of life of which animals
are capable clearly impose some duties
on us, including the duty not to be
cruel to them (p. 512). But if it is
these facts about animals themselves
which 1m-pose certain duties on us,
then these duties must be grounded in
these facts, and not based on speculaspecula
tions, asin Kant's view, about how
our treating animals in certain ways
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will lead us to treat human beings,
the good or ill effects of this latter
treatment for human beings constitutconstitut
ing the supposed gr'ounds of our
duties regarding animals.
All the
available evidence supports reading
Rawls as agreeing that some of our
duties regarding animals, including
particular our duty not to be cruel to
them, are duties we have directly to
animals themselves.
The dilemma posed above thus
seerdS
recalcitrant to attempts to
amputate or dull
its horns,
and
though there may be other attempted
defenses which have not been considconsid
ered here it seems fai r, in view of the
fa ilure
ilure of the defen ses wh ich have
been considered, to force the dilemma
home and require Rawls to choose
between the two alternatives: Either
being a person is a decisive considerconsider
ation for determining those to whom
natu ral duties are owed (or those to
whom natural duties "seem" . to be
owed) or it is not.
It cannot be
both. Reasons-have been advanced in
the above which support Rawls' selecselec
tion of the latter alternative, since it
is only by selecting it and then going
on to abandon both his strong and his
weak positions regarding justice and
animals that his views about how we
are to determine those to whom we
owe the natu ral duty of justice can be
reconciled with his views about how
we are to determine those to whom we
owe the natu ral duty not to be cruel.
Were Rawls to recognize the merits of
selecting the latter alternative, the
way would then be cleared for him to
explore a theory of justice that did
not "include ~ our relations with
those humans who are persons in the
actual world but also took into account
our natural duty of justice as this
relates to "how we are to conduct
ourselves
toward
animals."
What
shape that theory would take cannot
be determined in advance. All that is
certain is that it would be a quite
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different theory, all considered, than
the one Rawls has set forth to date. 8
Tom Regan
Regan�
North Carolina State University
University�
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